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PENNSYLVANIA COMMON LAW MARRIAGE AND
ANNULMENT: PRESENT LAW AND
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although the institution of marriage is age-old, as societal values
and structures change, it is incumbent upon the law to keep pace with
these changes. There has been a movement in Pennsylvania over the
past 8 years to modify the existing marriage and divorce laws so that
they may more adequately reflect a recognition of the current problems
in the delicate areas of creation and termination of marriage. It is the
purpose of this Comment to examine the existing law and the proposed
changes in two important areas - Common Law Marriage and Annulment.
II.

COMMON LAW MARRIAGES

A.

Requirements

A common law marriage is brought about through an agreement
of the parties and absent a ceremony or a license.' At the present time
such marriages are recognized as valid in Pennsylvania. This is so
because the courts have construed the Pennsylvania statute relating to
the issuance of marriage licenses as merely directory in nature rather
than mandatory. 2 There is thus state recognition of common law
marriage if the claim is reasonable and circumstances which would
normally invite suspicion or doubt as to its validity are absent. In
order to dispel this suspicion or doubt, certain essential requirements
must be met for the establishment of a common law marriage. These
requirements are: (1) some type of holding out to the public of one's
marital relationship, or (2) the effectuation of the marital union through
the use of words expressing present intent and consent. Additionally presumptions are available which affect the evidentiary burdens of claimants.
1. Holding Out
Holding out is essentially equivalent to what one would consider
reputation "in the sense that the parties had, relying upon their agreement,
lived together as husband and wife [cohabited] and were so known
and recognized in the communities in which they lived." 8 The require1. A. FREEDMAN & M. FREEDMAN, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN PENNSYLVANIA
100 (2d ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as FREEDMAN]. See also Sinclair v. Sinclair, 197
Pa. Super. 59, 176 A.2d 23 (1962).
2. E.g., Buradus v. Gen. Cement Prod. Co., 159 Pa. Super. 501, 48 A.2d 883,
aff'd, 356 Pa. 349, 52 A.2d 205 (1947). See generally 51 DICK. L. REV. 137 (1947).
3. Ksionska v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 169 Pa. Super. 439,
442, 82 A.2d 505, 506 (1951). This case further indicates that if a valid marriage
contract exists, evidence of cohabitation and reputation is merely corroborative of
that fact, thereby discounting the independent necessity of having a holding out. See
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ment of holding out is used to ensure that the parties regard themselves
as husband and wife. This recognition allegedly arises from the fact
that if the public deems them married, the parties, in creating such an
impression, also consider themselves married. However, this requirement
is an anachronism in light of the mobility of today's society. This
mobility often makes it difficult to establish a holding out for there
is always the chance that a couple may not be in one place long enough
to make the public aware of the fact that they consider themselves married
and would like everyone else to so regard them. A hypothetical situation
presents the essence of the problem: Migrant workers entering into
alleged common law marriages have great mobility. If the "public"
to which they must hold themselves out as husband and wife consists
of more than their constant traveling companions, it appears that the
holding out requirement could never be satisfied and the parties involved
could never enter into a valid common law marriage.
2.

Words of Present Consent
In addition to the holding out resulting in public knowledge of
marital status, the marriage must be effected through an informal contract between the parties which, in the manifestation of consent, refers
to a present as opposed to a future marriage. The requisite manifestation
of present consent is found in the use by the parties of words verba de
praesenti (words of present consent such as "I do take you as my wife")
as opposed to words verba de futuro (words of future consent such as
"I will take you to be my wife").4 The emphasis on this verbal distinction
is allegedly for the purpose of determining whether the parties spoke
the words "with a view and for the purpose of establishing the relationship of husband and wife. . ."' But the reliance on what was said in
order to prove or disprove this present intent is prone to criticism
because, in fact, the distinction is not promotive of its intended function.
The distinction fails because "unlettered persons frequently become confused in the use of tenses.
...6 It would appear that those most
likely to enter into common law marriage would be the ones least
.

FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 108; H. CLARK, LAW OC DOMESTIc RELATIONS 48
(1968). See generally Chlipala v. A.A. Morrison & Co., 44 F. Supp. 894, aff'd, 132
F.2d 320 (3d Cir. 1942) ; In re Estate of Stauffer, 372 Pa. 537, 94 A.2d 726 (1953) ;
Buradus v. Gen. Cement Prod. Co., 159 Pa. Super. 501, 48 A.2d 883, aff'd, 356 Pa.
349, 52 A.2d 205 (1947) ; Stump v. Stump, 111 Pa. Super. 541, 170 A. 393 (1934).
4. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 100, 108-09. See, e.g., In re Estate of Manfredi,
399 Pa. 285, 159 A.2d 697 (1960) ; Pierce v. Pierce, 355 Pa. 175, 49 A.2d 346 (1946) ;
Wilkinson v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 180 Pa. Super. 546, 119 A.2d 564 (1956) ; In re
Estate of Mathewson, 10 Lycoming 137 (1966). The court will look, not only to the
literal meaning of the words, but also to the context and circumstances under which
they were spoken. In re Estate of Seifert, 302 Pa. 477, 448-49, 153 A. 722 (1931).
The parties do not necessarily have to be in each other's presence. Commonwealth v.
Amann, 58 Pa. D. & C. 669 (Q.S. Camb. 1947).
5. In re Estate of Manfredi, 399 Pa. 285, 291, 159 A.2d 697, 700 (1960) ; Rager
v. Johnstown Traction Co., 184 Pa. Super. 474, 480, 134 A.2d 918, 922 (1957).
6. Caddy v. Johnstown Firemen's Relief Ass'n, 129 Pa. Super. 493, 499, 196 A.
590, 592 (1938).
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familiar with tensual nuances. 7 Thus, the interest of the state in fostering
those marriages in which the parties really intended to be wed seems to
be negated by the requirements imposed to establish such a marriage.
The harsh effects on those who had the requisite intent compels the
conclusion, already noted by one commentator, 8 that the verbal distinction
is totally theoretical and unrealistic, and, as such, should be abandoned.
3.

Presumptions
The difficulties in proving the essential elements to establish a common
law marriage are mollified to some extent by the availability of presumptions which may aid the claimant in his attempt to justify his
position. For example, it has been established in Pennsylvania that
cohabitation plus reputation yields a rebuttable presumption of marriage. 9
However, where a relationship was illicit at its inception, it is further
presumed to continue as such and the parties are prevented from availing
themselves of the presumption of marriage arising from the proof of
cohabitation and reputation. An illicit relationship is most often encountered where there was an impediment - e.g. a prior subsequent
marriage - to a valid marriage which was later removed. 10 Yet such
a meretricious relationship has also arisen where a man met a woman
in a brothel and thereafter lived with her as his mistress.' However,
the presumption of continuance of an illicit relationship can be overcome by "clear and convincing evidence' u 2 - i.e., proof of a marriage
ceremony - that the relationship has been changed from illicit to licit.'3
As previously mentioned, the presumption relating to continuance of
illicit relationships is most often encountered where there existed an
impediment to a valid marriage which was removed during the continuance of the relationship. The necessity of proving, by "clear and
convincing evidence," a change in the character of the relationship in
order to overcome the presumption of illicitness and therefore have
a valid marriage upon the removal of the impediment has not been
accepted without criticism. The viewpoint of one authority is that
"the requirement of proof of a specific contract after the removal of
the impediment seems to be a departure from the principle which recognizes the presumption of innocence. Where the presumption of innocence
is strengthened by the issue of legitimacy [where there is a child in7. See discussion p. 140 infra.

8.

FRUDMAN, supra note 1, at 120. See generally 7 PA. B.A.Q. 29 (1931),
which deals with the problem of words used in creating an informal marriage.
9. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 126. See, e.g., In re Estate of Wagner, 398 Pa.
531, 159 A.2d 495 (1960) ; Bisbing's Estate, 266 Pa. 529, 109 A. 670 (1920) ; Wilkinson v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 180 Pa. Super. 546, 119 A.2d 564 (1956).
10. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 135, 138-39; Pierce v. Pierce, 355 Pa. 175, 49
A.2d 346 (1946).
11. In re Estate of Patterson, 237 Pa. 24, 85 A. 75 (1912).
12. Drebot v. Drebot, 199 Pa. Super. 439, 441, 185 A.2d 617, 618 (1962).
13. FREDMAN, supra note 1, at 138; Pierce v. Pierce, 355 Pa. 175, 179, 49 A.2d
346, 348 (1946).
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volved], it is usually applied. The resulting discrimination, based upon
14
this mere difference in degree, would appear unsound.
There is no authoritative classification of cases involving the removal of an impediment in Pennsylvania. However, the fundamental
test applied in cases of this sort appears to be whether the relationship
has an innocent or bona fide character in terms of knowledge of the
impediment.'
For purposes of the following discussion it is assumed
that the impediment has been removed. The general statutory rule is
that where one or both of the parties entered into the marriage in good
faith without knowledge of the impediment or in the belief that the
impediment had been terminated, then upon removal of the impediment
they will be considered legally wed. 16 The application of this test varies
according to the factual situation presented, but there are generally only
three types of cases which arise. The first class of cases concerns the
situation in which both parties knew of the impediment at the time of the
intended marriage. When faced with this factual situation, the majority
7
view holds that the requisite matrimonial intent may not be ascribed.'
However, as already noted, there is a contrary view which posits that the
presumption of innocence necessitates the position that matrimonial cohabitation upon removal of the impediment is sufficient to render the
marriage valid.
Of the two divergent views the latter is more sound because the
courts could concern themselves most strongly with the bona fide desire
for matrimony rather than focusing solely on the question of knowledge
of the impediment.'5 By allowing the main inquiry to center on the
actual intent of the parties, the entire basis for common law marriage
would then appear to be made more uniform. This uniformity would
arise by virtue of the consistent emphasis placed on intent which, as
already seen, is the prime basis for the verbal distinction recognized
in establishing a valid common law marriage.19 It would seem ludicrous
to allow parties to establish the essential requirement of intent only to
subsequently have this intent nullified on the basis of knowledge of an
14. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 139.
15. Id. at 142.
16. PA. STAT. tit. 48, § 1-17 (1965), provides:
If a person, during the lifetime of a husband or wife with whom a marriage is
in force, enters into a subsequent marriage pursuant to the requirements of this
act, and the parties thereto live together thereafter as husband and wife, and
such subsequent marriage was entered into by one or both of the parties in good
faith in the full belief that the former husband or wife was dead, or that the
former marriage has been annulled or terminated by a divorce, or without knowledge of such former marriage, they shall, after the impediment to their marriage
has been removed by death of the other party to the former marriage, or by annulment or divorce, if they continue to live together as husband and wife in good
faith on the part of one of them, be held to have been legally married from and
immediately after the removal of such impediment.
17. Pierce v. Pierce, 355 Pa. 175, 49 A.2d 346 (1946) ; In re Estate of Yardley,
75 Pa. 207 (1874).
18. PA. STAT. tit. 48, § 1-17 (1965) ; FRggDMAN, supra note 1, at 145.
19. See discussion pp. 135-36 supra on verba de praesenti and verba de futuro.
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impediment. This is especially true since the impediment has already
been removed.
A second category of cases involves the situation in which neither
of the parties had knowledge of the impediment. In this factual context
removal of the impediment validates the marriage between the parties.
Although the law presently provides for this result only in cases of
licensed marriage, 20 one commentator states "that the statutory provision is an adequate expression of public policy which would find judicial
acceptance in cases of common law marriage."' 2 1 If so accepted, the
result reached would be realistic since, despite the fact that knowledge
of the impediment is still the main inquiry, the recognition of the validity
of the marriage effectively reflects the actual intent of the parties.
A third situation involves a marriage where only one of the parties
is innocent and without knowledge of the impediment. A Pennsylvania
statute validates such a marriage subsequent to removal of the impediment,22 thus expressing a view contrary to that of prior case law.2 3
The current law concerning the validity of common law marriages
after removal of a prior impediment seems thoroughly inadequate since
it does not reflect the intent of the parties. As one commentator has
stated: "[I]t would be well to be freed of the artificial view that a man
and woman who live together as husband and wife have no matrimonial
intention merely because it is impossible for them legally to accomplish
the result which they desire.

B.

24

Utility of Common Law Marriage

There are a number of divergent views concerning the usefulness
of common law marriages. One argument is that its justification is
reduced today because there is little difficulty in obtaining a marriage
license. 25 It is posited that when transportation was inadequate and
churches were scarce there was a sound justification for common law
marriages. Additionally, the practicalities of the situation, including the
difficulties incurred in trying to find someone to perform the ceremony,
necessitated the recognition of these marriages.2 6 Religious leaders see
no need today for allowing such an informal method of entering into
20. PA. STAT. tit. 48, § 1-17 (1965).
21. FREEDMAN, su pra note 1, at 146. See also JOINT STATE GOVERNMENT CoMMISSION, PROPOSED MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE CODES FOR PENNSYLVANIA (1961). This

is actually a compilation of separate Divorce and Marriage Codes which will hereinafter be cited as PROPOSED MARRIAGE CODE or PROPOSED DIVORCE ConE as appropriate.
PROPOSED MARRIAGE CODE,

section 221 retains the same provisions but with the addi-

tional provision that all children born to the marriage, whether before or after removal
of the impediment, shall be considered as legitimate issue.

22. PA. STAT. tit. 48, § 1-17 (1965).
23. See Hunt's Appeal, 86 Pa. 294 (1878), which held that the innocence of one

party made no difference. See generally 17 PA. B.A.Q. 89 (1945), on presumptions
in Pennsylvania.
24. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 157.
25. PROPOSED MARRIAGE CODE § 301, comment at 31.
26. 14 OKLA. L. Rgv. 291, 298 (1961) ; 18 TEMP. L.Q. 264, 265 (1944).
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such a solemn relationship.2 7 Modern conveniences, they state, make it
easy for parties to "formally" marry, but their view is less objective
than it might be since these leaders have an interest in formal religious
ceremonies. In any case, these differing views appear to be based on
the false presumption that common law marriages are entered into as
a result of a positive choice in lieu of a ceremonial marriage. In reality
they most often result from the belief of the parties that such a relationship will create a valid marriage or because the social customs of the
28
class condone the relationship.
The point of time at which the law becomes involved is the basis
of additional arguments against the continuance of common law marriage.
It is argued that abolition is necessary in order to curtail fraudulent
claims of marriage which arise most frequently in the settlement of
decedent's estates or in Workmen's Compensation claims. To fortify
their positions it has been found that claimants frequently recite the
latest appellate opinion language. 29 Thus a court is expected to believe
that perhaps 20 years ago the parties expressed their present intent to
be husband and wife in the exact manner found sufficient in the latest
decision. This practice has led the courts to closely scrutinize claims
of common law marriage and to adopt the view that such marriages
are to be tolerated but not encouraged.80 This view seems to be a
strained one at best since the evidentiary requirements in such proceedings seem to substantially lessen the chances for perpetration of a
fraud. Likewise, it would not seem presumptuous to believe that a court
could distinguish between fraudulent and legitimate claims.
Concomitant to the theory that common law marriage increases
fraud is the notion that it encourages vice in the form of debasement
of the institution of marriage. 8 ' This argument appears to be based
on circular reasoning. It is because common law marriages are held
in disrepute that they are recognized as promotive of vice. If, in actual
practice, they were recognized as having full validity along with ceremonial marriages rather than being viewed with suspicion at the outset,
the allegedly immoral effects of their existence would be significantly
reduced. Additionally, the recognition of their validity does not debase
the institution of marriage. Debasement would seem to be more prevalent
where the validity of a marriage depends solely upon the performance
of a ceremony because the essential functions of a marital relationship
do not require a marriage certificate. The elimination of common law
27. PROPOSED
297 (1961).

MARRIAGE

CODE §

301, comment at 35; 14

OKLA. L.

lRv. 291,

28. H. CLARK, supra note 3, at 57, 58; ten Broek, California's Dual System of
Family Law: Its Origin, Development and Present Status, 17 STAN. L. Rnv. 614,
617 (1965), wherein it is noted that "[cleremonial marriage is often expensive and
also may not be a part of the cultural mores of various minority groups."
29. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 102-04; PROPOSED MARRIAGE CODE § 301, comment at 35.

30. In re Estate of Wagner, 398 Pa. 531, 159 A.2d 495 (1960).
31. H. CLARK, supra note 3, at 57; 14 OKLA. L. Rzv. 291, 297 (1961).
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marriages could thus cause more injustice than permitting its continuance. This is particularly true in cases involving those economic and
social classes which are not governed by the middle class standards
which are applied to marriages. 3 2 Additionally, commentators agree that
the common law marriages are most prevalent among lower class Negroes
and whites and the poorer segments of society where it is generally
accepted. 3 These groups, which compose a significant portion of society,
must be taken into consideration before any steps are taken to deny
their marriages of their viability.
The arguments in favor of the continuance of common law marriage
seem to be more persuasive in that they take into account the true social
needs of society rather than purely administrative practicalities. The
United States, largely a melting-pot for individuals of other nationalities,
should remain cognizant of the varying social systems of the world as
well as those of its own sub-strata, and therefore retain as flexible a
structure as possible to validate those marriages which elsewhere are
34
socially and legally acceptable.
C. The Proposed Code
The Proposed Marriage Code would abolish common law marriages
and require that all future marriages be licensed according to the provisions of that Code. 35 This would eliminate most of the problems
previously discussed, and result in bringing Pennsylvania's law into
conformity with that of the vast majority of American jurisdictions."6
However, as previously noted, the retention of common law marriage
is to be preferred.
If the major deficiencies with the common law marriages as administered in Pennsylvania could be corrected then the basic structure
might be worth preserving. To maintain any viable system of common
law marriage, legislation is required to protect the legitimacy of children
32. H. CLARK, supra note 3, at 58; Arraros, Concubinage in Latin America,
3 FAM. L.J. 330, 333 (1963), discusses concubinage as a sexual relationship between
parties living together who procreate and raise a family although they never have
undergone a civil or religious marriage ceremony. He notes that concubinage is
accepted among the poor who develop their own norms, values, and attitudes despite
the fact that licensing is mandatory for a valid marriage. This illustrates the point
that classes often have their own standards not only with regard to concubinage,
but also as to common law marriage.
33. J. SIRJAMAKI, THE AMERICAN FAMILY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 69
(1959). See also Arraros, supra note 32, at 333; Borah & Cook, Marriage and
Legitimacy in Mexican Culture: Mexico and California, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 946, 947
(1966) ; ten Broek, supra note 26, at 618-19. However, see 14 OKLA. L. Rav. 291, 298
(1961), where it is stated: "The Indian tribes . . . are now civilized and it is inconceivable that anyone could be ignorant of this statutory scheme for marriage."
34. See Arraros, supra note 32, at 333, 334, where it is suggested that the
law must supply social needs and that to be successful "the framers of any nontotalitarian legal system must base it on social facts, needs, and aspirations of
its citizenry."
35. PROPOSED MARRIAGE CODE § 301.
36. Id.; H. CLARK, supra note 3, at 45; E. FooTE, R. LEvY & F. SANDER, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAw 207 (2d ed. 1966).
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and the property rights of the alleged spouse. Perhaps leaning toward
the idea that common law marriages should be retained the Pennsylvania
Legislature has already taken steps to insure the legitimacy of children
of defective marriages. 37 The result of this legislation is the assurance
of the legitimacy of offspring irrespective of the validity of the alleged
marriage. Similarly, in an attempt to rectify the difficult property problems which arise where the relationship is found wanting of one of the
elements necessary to establish a common law marriage, the legislature
has enacted the following provision:
In all matrimonial causes the court having jurisdiction may,
either dismiss the complaint, or enter a decree of divorce from the
bonds of matrimony, from bed and board or annulment of the
marriage. Where the court has jurisdiction over both parties . . .
it shall include in its decree, or in separate decrees pertaining to each
matter separately, an order or orders determining and disposing of
property rights and interests between the parties, custody and
visitation rights, child support and any related matters. 38
Although the statute makes it incumbent upon the court in all matrimonial causes to resolve the question of property rights in some equitable
fashion, the inherent difficulty in the provision is that its application is
limited to matrimonial causes. As previously noted, 9 most claims of
common law marriage do not arise in those cases which can be considered matrimonial causes (actions for divorce or annulment) but most
often arise in the settlement of a decedent's estate or in Workmen's
Compensation cases. The unjust results which could arise through a
strict application of the "matrimonial cause" distinction is best seen in
the following hypothetical situation:
A and B believe they have entered into a valid common law
marriage for 20 years. A dies intestate and there is a proceeding
concerning the distribution of A's property. If the court finds no
valid common law marriage, B receives no property.
In such a situation it would seem equitable for the survivor to have some
rights respecting the property left by the deceased. 40 The deleterious
37.

tit. 48, § 169.1 (1965), provides:
In all cases where a supposed or alleged marriage is contracted, which is
absolutely void by reason of one of the parties thereto having a spouse living at
the time of the supposed or alleged marriage, or if for any other lawful reason,
the said marriage was void or voidable when contracted, all children born to such
parties shall be deemed the legitimate children of both parties for all purposes.
It would appear that on nolicy grounds alone this provision would merit application
to situations involving unsuccessful attempts to create a common law marriage.
38. PA. STAT. tit. 23, § 55(1) (Supp. 1969) (emphasis added). Section (2) of
this provision provides for the use of the equity power of the court in order to
implement effective measures for the protection of these rights and interests. This
provision is identical to the PROPOSED MARRIAGE CODE §§ 601(1), (2), and (3),
which, as noted, would abolish common law marriages.
PA. STAT.

39. See p. 139 supra.

40. It is important to remember that common law marriages are rarely challenged
by the parties themselves in a matrimonial proceeding. Therefore, the claim of
common law marriage would arise most frequently in a situation such as the hypo-
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consequences encountered in the hypothetical situation could clearly be
avoided by amending the present provision to allow the court to make property divisions in all causes which ultimately turn on the validity of the
alleged marriage rather than restricting its scope to "matrimonial causes."
An alternative solution to the problem noted in the hypothetical
would be to allow the parties to petition for a prior determination of
the validity of their supposed marriage, and upon a finding of invalidity,
to permit the parties to rectify the situation with a subsequent valid
marriage. A statutory provision of this type could be modeled along
the lines suggested in the following provision of the Code:
When the validity of any marriage shall be denied or doubted by
either of the parties a bill or petition in the nature of a declaratory
judgment action may be filed in the court having jurisdiction over
divorce and annulment matters, seeking a declaration of the validity
or invalidity of the marriage, and upon due proof of the validity
or invalidity thereof it shall be decreed valid or invalid by decree
or sentence of such court, and, unless reversed upon appeal, such
declaration shall be conclusive upon all persons concerned. 41
Although the second alternative is adequate in theory, it raises serious
practical problems. If common law marriages occur most frequently
among lower class Negroes and whites it would seem that these people
are the ones who will be least likely to know about such a procedure
let alone avail themselves of it. Therefore, the first alternative, in a
practical light, would appear to be much better suited to the needs of
that portion of society affected. Probably the most useful solution would
be the adoption of both alternatives, thereby affording complete protection to those who are involved. With these positive changes in mind,
the institution of common law marriage could be retained with a more
enlightened outlook as to its social utility.
III.
A.

ANNULMENT

Void and Voidable Marriages

As a general proposition, the necessity for and effects of an annulment
are contingent upon the classification of the marriage as being void or
thetical. As opposed to the common law marriage situation, there are protections
offered in other States to a surviving spouse in decedent's estates proceedings when
the marriage was voidable (subject to annulment). Here, the validity of the marriage
may not be questioned after the death of one of the parties. Presently there are no
voidable grounds for annulment in Pennsylvania and therefore no such protection is
afforded. Where the marriage was void, the validity of it may be attacked in a collateral proceeding, and a problem similar to the hypothetical arises. The PROPOSED
MARRIAGE CODE § 303, eliminates the problem by allowing the court to make an
equitable property distribution under the circumstances.
41. PROPOSED MARRIAGE CODE § 305 (1961). This provision would be in conformity with the law in a number of states which permit suits to determine the status
of a marriage. Id., comment at 40.
On the subject of common law marriage in Pennsylvania see generally Pendel,
Common Law Marriage in Pennsylvania, 49 DICK. L. REv. 94 (1945).
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voidable since there are important distinctions between the two categories.
Void marriages are deemed to have had no validity at any time, while
voidable marriages are construed as valid until annulled by judicial decree.
Thus void marriages may be removed of their vitality without the
necessity of obtaining a judicial decree. Similarly, void marriages may
be collaterally attacked by third parties leading to the possibility of
challenges to their validity after the death of one of the parties. However, voidable marriages may not be attacked after the death of one of
the parties. 42 The annulment of a voidable marriage destroys its validity
ab initio (from the start) and thus, as with void marriages, results 4in3
the bastardization of any children and the impairment of property rights.
In Pennsylvania prior to the adoption of the two statutes protecting
legitimacy and property rights the policy was to make voidable marriages
terminable only by divorce. Under that policy the unjust results mentioned above - illegitimacy and loss of a spouse's property rights
occasioned by annulment - were avoided. 44 Such protection, however,
is not completely afforded to void marriages. Even under the new provisions, the aforementioned problem engendered by declaring a void
marriage invalid without a judicial decree would still exist because there
is no matrimonial cause involved which would allow the court to make an
equitable property distribution.
B.

Grounds For Annulment

Under existing Pennsylvania law the remedy of annulment is available
only in the case of a void marriage pursuant to a statute which provides:
In all cases where a supposed or alleged marriage shall have
been contracted, which is absolutely void by reason of one of the
parties thereto having a spouse living at the time of the supposed
or alleged marriage, or, if, for any other lawful reason, the said
supposed or alleged marriage was absolutely void when contracted,
42. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 12-13.
43. Id. It should be remembered that void marriages lead to the same results.
However, the problem has been resolved in Pennsylvania through the enactment of
PA. STAT. tit. 48, § 169.1 (1965) (legitimizing children of void and voidable marriages even though voidable grounds presently do not exist) and PA. STAT. tit. 23,
§ 55 (Supp. 1969) (providing for equitable distribution of property, but only in
matrimonial causes).
One commentator has distinguished void and voidable marriages by noting:
A marriage is . . . void . . . when, due to some fact or circumstance existing

at the time of the purported marriage, there . . . could not be any marriage at all.
On the other hand, a voidable marriage refers to . . . where, due to some fact
present at the time of the marriage, one or both of the parties is given a choice of
either treating the marriage as valid or of rendering it invalid.
Reader, The Annulment of Marriage in Pennsylvania, 41 DIcK. L. REv. 37, 38 (1938).
44. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 13; Reader, supra note 43. See Eisenberg v.
Eisenberg, 105 Pa. Super. 30, 160 A. 228 (1932). See generally Good, The Historical
Evolution of the Concepts of Void and Voidable Marriages, 7 FAM. L.J. 297 (1967).
The problem of property division has been resolved in most states by allowing the court to effect an equitable distribution upon annulment. H. CLARK, supra
note 3, at 136; 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 148, 156. See generally Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d
1255 (1953).
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such supposed or alleged marriage, may, upon the application of
either party, be declared null and void. .... 45
Courts have interpreted the statute as providing the following grounds
for annulment where the marriages are void: (1) marriages by minors
under 7 years of age; (2) marriages consummated where a party was
insane or intoxicated; (3) bigamous marriages; (4) marriages between
a respondent and co-respondent in adultery, contracted while the injured
libellant is still living; and (5) marriages contracted by mistake as to
46
matters essential to a marital union.
The underlying basis of the concept of void marriages is the principle
that since the status of marriage is arrived at by an agreement containing
elements similar to that of a contract it cannot be effected without the
mutual consent of the parties ;47 and this consent can only be determined
48
by investigating the intentions of the parties at the time of contracting.
Therefore, those grounds available for annulment are, with the exception
of marriage between a respondent and co-respondent in adultery, the
ones where mutual consent is, theoretically, least probable.
1.

Marriage by Minors

Contrary to the laws of the vast majority of other jurisdictions
which have statutorily raised the age of consent above that sufficient
under common law, 49 Pennsylvania has no statute fixing the minimum

age requirements for unlicensed marriages 0 Consequently, in Pennsylvania, common law marriages of males 14 years of age or over and
females 12 years of age or over are binding. Where both parties are
over the age of 7, but are below the common law age of consent, the
marriage is held inchoate or imperfect and may be disaffirmed by either
party after one or both of the parties have reached the common law
age of consent. Only if either party is under 7 years of age, is the
marriage void and annullable. 51 Public policy in the area of establishing
45. PA. STAT. tit. 23, § 12 (1965) ; See, e.g., Brennen v. Brennen, 80 Pa. D. & C.
90 (C.P. Fay. 1952).
46. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 13, 14; Grygo v. Grygo, 32 Pa. D. & C. 2d 176
(C.P. Lehigh 1964); Battaglia v. Battaglia, 23 Beaver 167 (1962). See generally
Lawler, Marital Status and Annulment in Pennsylvania, 4 U. PIT'r. L. Rtv. 251
(1938), for a discussion of the history and development of the law of annulment
in Pennsylvania.
47. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 15.
48. In Barnett v. Kimmel, 35 Pa. 13 (1859), it was noted that "the intentions of
the parties to an alleged contract of marriage . . . is to be gathered from what took
place at the time it was entered into, not from the mental reservations or secret intentions of either of the parties."
49. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 30, 31; Moore, Defenses Available in Annulment
Actions, 7 FAM. L.J. 239, 256-58 (1967).
50. The common law age of consent is therefore not raised in Pennsylvania since,
as previously noted, existing age requirements only apply to licensed marriages, which
are not mandatory. See PA. STAT. tit. 48, § 1-5 (1965) and p. 134 supra.
51. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 28-29; Brown & Porta, A Survey of the Law
of Marriage and Divorce in Pennsylvania, 23 TEMP. L.Q. 371, 389 (1949-50).
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durable marriages seems to demand some protection against marriages
at such an early age.
2.

Insanity and Intoxication
In Pennsylvania, where either of the parties was insane at the time
of contracting, the marriage is absolutely void.5 2 The method of determining whether one is insane has been stated to be "whether at the
precise time of the marriage the party had sufficient intelligence to understand the nature of the contract and relation into which he was entering.' "
This concept is easily justified because under such circumstances the
party so afflicted is incapable of the prerequisite consent necessary to
establish a marriage.
Additionally, where either or both of the parties are intoxicated
to such a degree as to destroy one's mental capacity to contract, the
marriage is held void for lack of consent.5 4 Despite the apparent reasonableness of this position, it should be the subject of reform. It is conceivable that the parties, although intoxicated, did in fact intend to be
married. This intent could have existed prior to and just after the
ceremony despite the fact that the parties were inebriated at the time
of the ceremony. Retention of the present provision would allow disaffirmance of the marriage even after a lengthy period of time, despite
the fact that at the time of the ceremony the parties effectively had
the requisite intent. In order to protect the parties in such cases, there
should be a time limit imposed within which the action must be brought
for it to be declared invalid.
3.

Bigamy
Marriages contracted while there is a prior subsisting marriage are
void.5 5 Bigamy is thereby expressly repudiated and made grounds for
annulment. 56 An exception to the application of the rule arises where
the remarriage was entered into by one or both of the parties in "good
52. In re Newlin's Estate, 231 Pa. 312, 80 A. 255 (1911); Nonnemacher v.
Nonnemacher, 159 Pa. 634 (1894) ; Faivre v. Faivre, 182 Pa. Super. 365, 128 A.2d
139 (1956) (holding the remedy of annulment is available against an insane defendant) ; Herr v. Herr, 109 Pa. Super. 42 (1933) ; Ryce v. Ryce, 15 Pa. D. & C. 2d
126 (C.P. Phila. 1959); Zisser v. Zisser, 60 Pa. D. & C. 21 (C.P. Dauph. 1947)
(dictum). See Foster, Domestic Relations, 19 U. PiTt. L. Riv. 348, 351 (1958),
discussing the Faivre case.
53. Nonnemacher v. Nonnemacher, 159 Pa. 634, 637 (1894).
54. Imhoff v. Witmer, 31 Pa. 243 (1858) ; Lupinacci v. Lupinacci,
D. & C.
429 (C.P. Phila. 1941). Cf. Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 45 Pa. D. &42C.Pa.
659 (C.P.
Blair 1942) (alleged marriage where both parties were intoxicated was held voidable
and therefore not annullable).
55. Heffner v. Heffner, 23 Pa. 104 (1854) ; DeRosay v. DeRosay, 162 Pa. Super.
333, 57 A.2d 685 (1948) ; Wagner v. Wagner, 152 Pa. Super. 4, 30 A.2d 659 (1943)
;
Grygo v. Grygo, 32 Pa. D. & C. 2d 176 (C.P. Lehigh 1964) ; Grant v. Grant, 71 Pa.
D. & C. 523 (C.P. Phila. 1950). Pennsylvania as well as twenty three other jurisdictions consider a bigamous marriage void. In most of these jurisdictions plaintiff's
knowledge of a prior marriage is no defense to an annulment proceeding against a
bigamous spouse. Moore, supra note 49, at n.28, and at 265.
56. PA. STAT. tit. 23, § 12 (1965).
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faith" without knowledge of any impediment and they continue to cohabit after removal of the impediment. Under those circumstances the
marriage is legal.5 7 Legality in such situations, although based on notions
of knowledge, is appropriate because it also reflects the intentions of
the parties. The real problem arises where both parties knew of the
impediment and the present rule has already been criticized for its
failure to reflect intent.58
4.

Marriages of Adulterer and Co-Respondent
The marriage of an adulterer and his co-respondent following a
divorce on the grounds of adultery is void if entered into during the
lifetime of the aggrieved spouse. 59 It appears that the underlying rationale
for this view is that the adulterous parties should not be rewarded for
their moral turpitude and further embarrass the innocent spouse. Such
a concept seems to be based upon a logical inconsistency since the
divorce proceedings may, in and of themselves, subject the spouse to
embarrassment; and the interests of society are not served when punishment is made too severe or is unrelated to the "crime." The interest
of society is served by promoting valid marriages; and if two adulterous
parties are serious in their desire to be married subsequent to the divorce
there appears to be no logical reason for preventing this. For if they
are sincere, the imposition of invalidity upon their attempted marriage
would force them into a meretricious relationship which appears far
worse for the parties concerned; and is detrimental to the fulfillment
of society's goals.
5.

Mistake and Jest
The validity of marriages made by mistake or in jest also rests on
the basis of consent.
If . . . the mistake is of such character that it prevents the party

from understanding the nature of the marriage, it must necessarily
avoid it, for . . . there can be no mutual consent. 0

Under this rationale, the fact that a party is mistaken as to the spouse's
fortune, character, and the like is not sufficient to void a marriage, for
they do not affect the essentials of the marriage. 6 1 The requirement
that it "affect the essentials of the marriage" virtually nullifies the applicability of mistake as an annulment ground. It is thus in cases of
marriages entered into in jest that the lack of mutual consent is most
often found. And under such circumstances the marriages are deemed
57.

PA. STA'r. tit. 48, § 1-17 (1965).
58. See pp. 137-38 supra.
59. Braun v. Braun, 194 Pa. 287, 44 A. 1096 (1900) ; Stull's Estate, 183 Pa. 625,
39 A. 16 (1898); Maurer v. Maurer, 163 Pa. Super. 264, 60 A.2d 440 (1948);
Kolmbacher v. Kolmbacher, 63 Pa. D. & C. 195 (C.P. Susq. 1945).
60. FRZXDMAN, supra note 1, at 26 (emphasis added).
61. Id.; see, e.g., Lindquist v. Lindquist, 130 N.J. Eq. 11, 20 A.2d 325 (1941).
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to be void. 62 The problem in this area is that occasionally cases arise
in which there was an intent to marry, but only in order to accomplish
a specific purpose - e.g., to give a child a name. Although one Pennsylvania case 3 has held such a marriage annullable, other cases which
involve giving a child a name or marrying to fulfill a specific purpose
indicate that a marriage contracted for such a purpose alone is not
annullable. 4 This line of authority was probably a prime reason which
65
led to the adoption of the statute guaranteeing the legitimacy of children.
IV.

THE PROPOSED CODE

The problems evident in the present Pennsylvania domestic relations
law must be corrected. The Proposed Marriage and Divorce Code, in
recognition of these problems, has incorporated in its provisions many
useful suggestions. Although there are areas in which the Code could
have made further improvement, it is, in its present form far better
than existing law.
A.

Marriages by Minors

As previously noted, in order to promote more stable marital relationships the state must take measures to prevent the occurrence of
drastically underage marriages. The Proposed Marriage Code attempts
to effectuate this policy by providing that:
The marriage of any person shall be deemed voidable and subject to annulment in the following cases:
(a) Where either party to such marriage was under sixteen
years of age, unless. such marriage was expressly authorized by
a judge of the orphan's court, as provided in Section 207 of
this act;
(b) Where such person, although sixteen years of age, is
a minor under twenty-one who lacked the consent of parent
or guardian or permission of the orphan's court and has not
subsequently ratified such marriage upon reaching majority and
such proceeding of annulment is commenced within sixty days
after the ceremony as provided in Section 207 [c] of this
act .... 66
62. See, e.g., McClung v. Terry, 21 N.J. Eq. 225 (1870); Lannaman v. Lannaman, 171 Pa. Super. 147, 89 A.2d 897 (1952).
63. Osgood v. Moore, 38 Pa. D. & C. 263 (C.P. Tioga 1940).
64. Perry v. Perry, 78 Pa. Super. 245 (1922) (to evade draft) ; Proios v. Proios,
76 Pa. D. & C. 509 (C.P. Beaver 1951) (to obtain entrance to the country) ; Bove v.
Pinciotti, 46 Pa. D. & C. 159 (C.P. Phila. 1942) (to legitimize a child).
65. PA. STAT. tit. 48, § 169.1 (1965).
66. PROPOSSD MARRIAGE Coos § 304 (emphasis added). Section 304(a) refers to
section 207(b) which requires commencement of the annulment action within 60 days
after reaching 16 years of age. On the other hand, section 304(b) makes reference
to section 207(c) which requires petition for annulment while still under 21 years
of age and within 60 days of the unauthorized marriage. Section 304(b) provides an
additional defense in the form of ratification upon reaching majority. These provisions
would help to alleviate the problem encountered where an underage marriage con-
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These proposed provisions allow for a more sensible approach. They
only make such marriages voidable and provide built-in defenses commencement of the action within 60 days after reaching 16 years of
age; subsequent ratification upon reaching majority and commencing
suit within 60 days after the ceremony - which are sufficient to allow
67
for dissolution in those marriages attributable to youthful indiscretion.
B.

Insanity and Intoxication

In its treatment of insanity or mental disease and disorder section
303(c) of the Proposed Marriage Code preserves the void classification.
As previously noted, this is justified since insanity at the time of contracting surely precludes any possibility of consent..
In addition, the Proposed Marriage Code is helpful in rectifying the
problems encountered with intoxication as a ground for annulment.
Under section 304(c) of the Code, intoxication at the time of contracting makes the marriage voidable if a petition for annulment is filed
within 60 days after the date of the ceremony. This section is further
refined by section 224(5) which declares that subsequent cohabitation
when not intoxicated ratifies the marriage. 68 Additionally, there is a
conclusive presumption of ratification if a petition is not filed within
the aforementioned time limit. In proposing changes to the existing
law, the drafters of the Code seem to be cognizant of the intentions of
the parties. In effect, those who seriously intended to be married would
be deemed to have a valid marriage, while those who did not intend to
be married would be able to petition for annulment.
C. Bigamous Marriages
The Proposed Marriage Code provision relating to bigamous marriages
is quite similar to the present law. These marriages are still to be
considered void; 69 and the "good faith" test with respect to subsequent
removal of an impediment is retained.7 0 One significant change, however,
is made by providing that a remarriage will be considered valid where
the party concerned has obtained a decree of presumed death of his or
tracted in another jurisdiction which makes such marriages voidable is sought to be

annulled in Pennsylvania. Presently, Pennsylvania will not annul the marriage because
it was merely voidable in the state of celebration. Forry v. Forry, 42 Pa. D. & C. 2d
769 (C.P. Monroe 1967). See also PROPOSED DIVORCE CODE § 303.
67. It should be pointed out that if common law marriages are retained, then the
common law age of consent should be raised by statute in order to afford greater
protection against underage marriages.
68. See Moore, supra note 49, at 275-76, stating: "One can effect a ratification
by continuing to cohabit after learning of the impediment . . . by pursuing-9n inconsistent remedy, or by expressly condoning the objectionable act or condition." It
should be noted that the principle of ratification serves as a defense to a number of
annulment actions based on voidable grounds. Id. at 275-89.
69. PROPOSED MARRIAGE CODE § 303(a).

70. PROPOSED MARRIAGE CoDE § 221. However, the remarriage must be pursuant
to a license since common law marriages are abolished.
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her former spouse irrespective of whether or not the first spouse returns.
The significance of the change arises from the fact that the period of
absence recognized as creating a presumption of death is reduced from
7 to 5 years.7 1 This latter change therefore takes notice of the improved
means of communication and transportation existent today. With modern
technology, information concerning the condition of the absent spouse
is more readily obtainable. 72 However, the question of adequately reflecting the intentions of the parties upon removal of an impediment is left
unanswered. The emphasis of the court would still be directed to
knowledge of the impediment rather than matrimonial intent.
D.

MarriagesBetween Adulterers and Co-Respondents

Although the Proposed Marriage Code does not specifically make
marriages between an adulterer and co-respondent void, the probability
of its prohibition is implicitly recognized in section 1002. This section
refers to a court granting a divorce which "forbids either of the parties
to marry again for a certain time or within the lifetime of a former
spouse. . . ,,17 Therefore, it would appear that because the Code fails
to make any definite change in this area the absurd results which arise
from such a prohibition would be destined, at least for the present,
to continue.
E. Mistake and Jest
Section 303(c) of the Proposed Marriage Code would appear to
take a position consistent with present Pennsylvania law in the area of
marriages in jest or through mistake by providing that these marriages
are void "[w]here one or both parties to such purported marriage was
incapable of consenting to the marriage relationship by reason of insanity,
mental disease or disorder, or otherwise lacked capacity to consent or did
not intend to assent to such marriage relationship."7 4 The provision
would seem noteworthy only in its reinforcement of the fundamental
notion of requisite intent.
V.

DEFENSES

To

ANNULMENT

AND

NEW PROPOSED GROUNDS

The majority of American jurisdictions permit the interposition of
a defense to annulment proceedings only when dealing with marriages
which are voidable.75 Thus, even where a plaintiff entered into a void
71.

PROPOSED MARRIAGE

CODE

§§

303(a),

210. The present Pennsylvania pro-

vision is found in PA. STAT. tit. 48, § 1-8 (1965).
72. PROPOSED MARRIAGE CODE § 210, comment at 25.
73.

PROPOSED MARRIAGE CODE § 1002.

74. PROPOSED MARRIAGE CODE § 303(c) (emphasis added).
75. Moore, supra note 49, at 240. These defenses are more appropriately termed
bars to relief.
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marriage with knowledge of the impediment and further conducted
himself in a censurable fashion, he will be granted an annulment 76 knowledge of the impediment may not be interposed as a defense.
Pennsylvania only permits annulment for void marriages and therefore
77
no defenses may be raised in the action.
The Proposed Marriage Code alters the present unavailability of
defenses by advocating the adoption of annulment grounds which serve
to make the marriage voidable. Additionally, although not as noteworthy,
the Code adds a new void ground for annulment. As a result, a marriage
would be void if the parties to it were related within the prohibited
degrees of consanguinity. 78 It is important to note that although this
type of marriage would be considered void, the Code provides that after
the death of one of the parties the validity of the marriage may not be
79
questioned if it was not annulled during the lifetime of the parties.
Such a provision is contrary to the general rule in void marriages which
permits collateral attack after the death of one of the parties.8 0 Thus,
the harsh results that might occur in a proceeding to settle a decedent's
estate if the marriage were attacked and found void are avoided. 8 '
As previously mentioned, the more significant change made by the
Code is the addition of voidable grounds for annulment. Those grounds
which have been added are the following:
1. Impotency unless known to the other party at the time of the
marriage.82
2. Inducement through "fraud, duress, coercion, or force, attributable to the other party, and there has been no subsequent voluntary co76. Id. at 261.
77. However, it has been noted by one commentator that in Pennsylvania, marriages void by reason of insanity may be validated upon cohabitation during a lucid
interval. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 41.
78. PROPOSED MARRIAGE CODE §§ 219, 303(b), and 207(h). The following are
the prohibited degrees of consanguinity:
A man may not marry his mother.
A man may not marry his father's sister.
A man may not marry his mother's sister.
A man may not marry his sister.
A man may not marry his daughter.
A man may not marry the daughter of his son or daughter.
A woman may not marry her father.
A woman may not marry her father's brother.
A woman may not marry her mother's brother.
A woman may not marry her brother.
A woman may not marry her son.
A woman may not marry the son of her son or daughter.
It should be noted that marriages between first cousins would no longer be within the
prohibited degrees of consanguinity.
79.

PROPOSED MARRIAGE CODE

§ 219.

80. See p. 143 supra.
81. See pp. 141-43 supra.
82. PROPOSED MARRIAGE CODE § 304(d).
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habitation after knowledge of such fraud or release from the effects
of duress, coercion, or force." 8
3. Where the purposes of the marriage are immediately frustrated
through the law or action of a jurisdiction which prevents the parties
from living together as husband and wife, or the physical condition of
one of the parties endangers the life or may seriously affect the health
84
of the other.
A.

Impotency

Impotency is not presently a ground for annulment in Pennsylvania.
However, section 304(d) of the Proposed Code would add impotency
as a voidable ground. The proposed statute provides a built-in defense
to a claim of impotency if the complaining party knew of the impotency
at the time of the marriage. It has been stated that "a spouse normally
will not be granted an annulment on the ground that his mate is impotent,
or that he himself is thus afflicted, if the evidence indicates that the
plaintiff knew of the impediment before the marriage."' 5 Thus, the
availability of this defense is well recognized and often is provided for
within the statutory provision itself.8 6 There are no particular problems
associated with the addition of impotency as voidable ground for annulment other than the usual evidentiary requirements which would have
to be met in order to establish the cause of action and the defense.
B.

Fraud

The addition of fraud as a voidable ground for annulment would
be new in Pennsylvania. In most other jurisdictions fraud does create
a voidable marriage; 87 but it should be pointed out that as in cases of
mistake, it would appear that the fraud must concern those matters vital
to the marital relationship. 88 Where the remedy of annulment is available,
courts tend to deny the action on the grounds of fraud where the party
so alleging had prior knowledge that the claims were fraudulent. The
view expressed in those cases is that there was no fraud since the requisite
elements of deception and justifiable reliance are absent, and that therefore
a subsequent request for annulment must be denied. 89 Section 304(e)
83. PROPOSED MARRIAGZ CODp § 304(e).
84.

PROPOSED MARRIAGS CoDz § 304(f).

85. Moore, supra note 49, at 255.
86. See, e.g., DZL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1551 (1953).
87. See Jewett v. Jewett, 196 Pa. Super. 305, 175 A.2d 141 (1961).
88. See pp. 146-47 supra.
89. Moore, supra note 49, at 249-50. One interesting variation arises when the

fraud perpetrated consisted of telling the party that he was the father of an expected
child. Under these circumstances most courts will allow the annulment.
However, a significant number of decisions have denied the plaintiff relief,
holding that he does not enter court with clean hands. Some courts consider
plaintiff's hands to be sullied because he acted reprehensibly in having coitus with
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of the Proposed Marriage Code, in making fraud a voidable ground
for annulment, would, in all likelihood, allow the similar use of this
defense. Additionally, section 304(e) provides for a specific defense by
depriving the marriage of its voidable status where there is "subsequent
voluntary cohabitation after knowledge of such fraud." The latter defense
is especially objectionable because it is impregnated with the fault concept.
As in the case of the defense of condonation in divorce, the notion
of fault frequently fails to advance the state's interest of promoting
stable marriages. One effect of the defense of cohabitation after knowledge of the fraud could be to promote an irreconcilable marriage. One
might envision the "innocent" party, on advice of counsel and unsure
of the future of his or her marriage, staying away from his or her
spouse to prevent the interposition of the defense. This would prevent
the imposition of subsequent cohabitation as a defense to the annulment
action, but it would also serve to draw the parties apart pending annulment
rather than encouraging reconciliation.

C.

Frustration of Purpose and Physical Condition

This provision, allowing annulment where the purposes of the
marriage are frustrated by law or where the physical condition of one
spouse endangers the life of the other, is a completely new concept in
Pennsylvania and other jurisdictions. The latter part of the provision
would appear to be subject to the defense that the physical condition
of the one spouse does not dangerously affect the life or health of the
other. One other possible defense might be knowledge of such physical
condition at the time of the marriage. However, since this is not
specifically noted, as it is for impotency, the availability of it as a
defense is dubious. The first part of the provision presents some difficulties in that the drafters of the Code do not adequately explain its
purposes. There seem to be two possible interpretations applicable to
the provision. The first is that the ground provided is designed to allow
annulment in some situations which would also constitute grounds for
divorce. Thus, the frustration through law could be analogized to a
divorce granted for desertion where one of the parties is a convicted
criminal and is jailed for an extended period of time, 90 or to mental
commitment which after a statutorily specified period of time might
provide a ground for divorce. 91 An alternate choice of annulment in
these cases would be advantageous because the action could be instituted
respondent before marriage, and other courts deem his hands to be tarnished
because he received antenuptial notice (from her conduct with him) that respondent was not virtuous.
Id. at 250-51.
90. See Comment, Grounds and Defenses to Divorce in Pennsylvania, 15 VILL.
L. Rev. 155, 157-58 (1969).
91. Id. at 171-72.
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immediately92 and the parties could be spared the social stigma attached to
a divorce. However, the provision is equally open to the interpretation
that it is designed to cover those situations which do not depend on
the actions of the parties themselves, but rather on forces coming from
outside of the marital union. An example of this would be where
"an English sailor married a Russian woman . . . during the war ...
After cessation of hostilities . . . he sought to get her to join him in

England but Russian authorities forbade her leaving Russia and hence
the law to which she was subject prevented the marriage from being
fulfilled.9 3 The drafters do not distinguish the type of situation that the
provision is intended to cover. If it is either of the two aforementioned
ones, or possibly a totally different one, then it is imperative that the
drafters clear up the ambiguity.
The new grounds posited by the Proposed Marriage Code, if adopted,
would bring Pennsylvania annulment law into harmony with other jurisdictions. As previously noted, at present only those marriages which
are considered void are subject to annulment. The Code takes certain
grounds which had previously been reserved as divorce grounds9 4 and
makes them grounds for annulment. Although annulment as a method
of dissolving a marital relationship is not used to a great degree, it does
serve important functions. Where applicable, it allows dissolution of a
marriage without the stigma normally attached to a divorce proceeding;
it allows dissolution without requiring an "innocent anid injured"
spouse;95 and, it allows immediate termination which is not possible
under certain divorce grounds. 90

VI.

CONCLUSION

Although Pennsylvania has taken some positive steps - legitimacy
of children and property distributions - in the reformation of its domestic relations law, there are many steps that could and should be taken
to improve the field. The Proposed Marriage and Divorce Code could
serve, by its adoption, as a vehicle for the implementation of many of
these necessary changes.
The addition of voidable grounds for annulment is consistent with
the approach of other jurisdictions in that it relegates antenuptial offenses
to their proper place. The antenuptial offense, by virtue of its occurrence
prior to the marriage, affects the validity of the marriage from its inception, unlike postnuptial offenses which arise after the marriage takes
place. Therefore, they are more properly grounds for annulment.
92. For example, an action for desertion may not be brought before a lapse of 2
years. PA. SWAT. tit. 23, § 10 (1955).
93. PROPOSED)MARRIAGE CODE § 304, comment at 39-40.
94. PA. STAT. tit. 23, § 10 (1965).
95. Comment, Domestic Relations - Law of Annulment in Pennsylvania - Effect
of Proposed Marriage Code, 4 VILL. L. Rev. 533, 534 (1959).
96. PA. STAT. tit. 23, § 10 (1955).
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Naturally, there are also a number of shortcomings in the recommended changes. In the area of removal of impediments the emphasis
is still placed on knowledge of the impediment rather than on the intent
of the parties. And the medieval concept prohibiting the marriage of
an adulterer and a co-respondent during the lifetime of the libellant is
certainly worthy of review.
The position of the drafters of the Code in regard to the abolition
of common law marriages was, no doubt, based on the sincere belief that
they served no purpose other than to confuse the law of domestic
relations. However, it is submitted that the arguments advanced in
support of the retention of common law marriage outweigh the difficulties which led to the proposal for change.9 7 If the emphasis on
abolition were redirected toward measures which would make common
law marriages a viable institution, the result would be a more adequate
reflection, in the legal system, of the social needs and realities of those
whose relations are governed by such laws. It would seem that this should
be a prime consideration in the establishment or proposal of any law. 98
Steven G. Brown
97. See pp. 138-40 supra.

98. See note 34 supra.
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